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Abstract 
This paper examines how environmental regulation is made operational when it 
legislates for modifications rather than the banning of products or substances. The 
continued circulation of such products draws attention to the heterogeneous 
conditions of their use and allows industry actors to accumulate evidence of the 
products’ polluting effects over time. We find that this agentic quality of materials – 
including products and sites of application – is a vital and so far largely ignored 
dimension in the relationship between environmental regulation and innovation. This 
is captured in a process we term interactive stabilization, which describes how 
material agency becomes a focus for interactions between regulatory and industry 
actors. We develop our argument through an in-depth case study of the environmental 
regulation of production chemistry and identify three interactive processes: 
formulating regulatory principles; operationalizing these principles through technical 
documentation and calculation; and incremental innovation as used by chemists to 
address clients’ varied material problems in production. We trace stabilizing and 
destabilizing effects across these three processes and draw particular attention to the 
role of uncertainty in the operationalization of precaution as a regulatory principle. 
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We argue that this uncertainty may lead to a form of regulatory capture that we frame 
as technological capture. This refers to how industry actors are able to test the limits 
of regulatory principles and calculations and on occasion contest these through their 
applied science capabilities. 
 
Key words: Regulatory capture, technological capture, precautionary principle, 
incremental innovation, socio-economic interaction, material agency 
JEL codes: O38; Q55; Q58  
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1. Introduction 
It has been a long-standing theme in policy research that regulation can stimulate and 
support innovation and that businesses can return net profits from innovations 
undertaken in response to regulation (Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Ambec et al., 
2013). Environmental regulation can tie polluting effects to products and necessitate 
change in product formulations, production techniques, or production and research 
facilities. Regulatory principles, such as the principle of precaution, provide 
orientations and motivations for these innovations. However, they may offer little 
specific guidance to regulators and industrial actors on how to make these principles 
operational (Klinke et al., 2006; Veal and Mouzas, 2012). Operationalizing regulatory 
principles through incremental innovation activities tests these principles ‘on the 
ground’ by bringing them into contact with a regulated product’s contexts of 
production, exchange, and use (MacKenzie, 2009). In this paper, we argue that a 
focus on operationalizing has much to offer in understanding the relationship between 
regulation and incremental innovation, especially from a process perspective (Callon, 
2009). Our purpose is three-fold: firstly, to establish how actors make regulation 
operational; secondly, to assess the ways in which, through this operationalizing, 
industry actors’ innovative activities interact with regulation; and thirdly, to evaluate 
the potential consequences of these interactions. 
Our contribution is to propose and develop the idea of interaction among regulators 
and regulated companies as a form of regulatory capture, which we refer to as 
‘technological capture’. Gagnon (2016) develops this concept to explain how 
companies acquire a dominant competitive position by articulating and imposing 
technological standards and intellectual property rights. We extend technological 
capture to explain the interactions between a well-resourced industry, with a 
significant applied science base, and a trans-national regulatory commission, charged 
with controlling the environmental hazards of the industry’s products. We see this as 
a process through which industrial actors use their science and technological 
resources in developing solutions to regulatory demands applied across heterogeneous 
settings. Here companies’ efforts and experiments allow them to test, challenge, and 
shape regulations, albeit from a fragmented evidential base, which may lead to a weak 
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form of regulatory capture in the sense of being guided or mediated by the norms of 
applied science. 
In common with recent research, we understand regulation as a process. This process 
is a concerted effort often instigated by governments or intergovernmental entities 
that develop regulatory principles and suggest ways to make these operational to other 
regulatory stakeholders (Carolan, 2007; Knol, 2011; Udovyk and Gilek, 2014). 
Following the OECD’s (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
1997) categorizations, regulation includes: (1) activities within markets such as taxing 
goods or establishing a market price for units of hazard; (2) institutional changes such 
as with governments devising programs to attribute externalities to established 
exchanges; and (3) social and environmental programs aimed at changing actors’ 
behaviors in the production and use of established goods and services (Blind, 2012; 
2016). Market mechanisms and institutional changes can be understood as stabilizing 
the impact of regulation on an industry’s innovative activities over time, for instance 
as specific products are identified and prohibited (Hardy and Maguire, 2010). Social 
interaction can help actors to ‘develop some shared understandings and definitions 
about … roles, means, and outcomes in order to coordinate their actions’ (Dionysiou 
and Tsoukas, 2013, p. 188), which can also have stabilizing effects at the interface of 
regulation and innovation. However, interaction may also lead to regulatory capture, a 
process by which those regulated ‘end up manipulating the state agencies that are 
supposed to control them’ (Dal Bó, 2006, p. 203; Laffont and Tirole, 1991).  
Economic sociologists have developed the notion of regulatory capture by examining 
different types of interaction, such as corrosive and cultural capture (Carpenter, 2004; 
Carpenter and Moss, 2014). These contributions direct our attention to actors 
contending with one another’s expertise through their social interactions (Carrigan, 
2014). Our account of technological capture adds to these contributions by 
considering materiality in addition to social interactions as an alternative and 
additional explanation for regulatory capture specifically in science-intensive 
industries. In circumstances where regulation attends to modifying rather than 
banning products and services, regulators make critical demands on the science and 
technology bases of those industrial actors tasked with implementing regulations 
(Udovyk and Gilek, 2014). In these situations, industrial actors may encounter and 
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cope with multiple uncertainties emanating from material idiosyncrasies in 
production, exchange, and use over time. Following Pickering (1995), we term this 
‘material agency’. Seen from a process perspective, uncertainties may stimulate 
further episodes of incremental innovation and permit the testing of regulation under 
heterogeneous conditions. This increases the likelihood of contesting or capturing 
regulation through an accumulation of applied scientific evidence. Consequently, we 
argue that where environmental regulation focuses on products that remain in 
circulation, the relationship between regulation and incremental innovation is one of 
interactive stabilization, made and remade through interactions around material 
effects (Pickering, 1995).  
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we draw together extant research on the 
relationship between regulation and innovation. We show that in regulatory settings in 
which hazards are qualified and not fully predictable, the relationship between 
regulation and incremental innovation in particular is interactive and raises 
demanding questions. After explaining our methodological choices and our case 
setting in Section 3, we pursue the theme of regulating and innovating under material 
uncertainty in Section 4. Here we follow the operationalization of regulatory 
principles in offshore chemistry, emphasizing interaction and feedback loops. We 
then return to extant theoretical frameworks in regulation and innovation in Sections 5 
and 6, and work through the implications of our empirical insights for research and 
policy. 
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1 The relationship between regulation and innovation 
In what has become known as the Porter Hypothesis, Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
proposed that the relationship between regulation and innovation develops along a 
relatively stable path: from costly disruption to adaptation, enhanced innovative 
activity and potentially positive economic returns on innovation. In a comprehensive 
review, Ambec et al. (2013) argue that empirical assessments of the Porter Hypothesis 
have tended to be cross-sectional or two-period, and have neglected assessments that 
capture an innovation process unwinding dynamically in response to regulation. 
Similarly, Blind (2016) identifies the need for further research into the processes by 
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which companies react to regulation. The Porter Hypothesis envisages a relationship 
and therefore stability. However, in process terms, the conditions and development of 
such stability are issues to be addressed rather than remaining implicit in any 
estimated relationship. 
Blind (2012) presents a macroeconomic analysis of economic growth and regulation 
by examining a dataset of firms drawn from the OECD. This analysis confirms Porter 
and van der Linde’s hypothesis that regulatory disruption in the short term is followed 
by positive economic returns from producers’ innovations developed in response to 
change. Kesidou and Demirel’s (2012) microeconomic analysis focuses on the 
changing intensity or stringency of regulation and firms’ capability to respond, which 
is associated with variations in innovation effort. Capabilities have the potential to be 
stable, as routines, and a basis for cumulative, sustainable competitive advantage 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). Ambec et al. (2013) point out that in behavioral or 
organizational terms, managerial and corporate routines introduce inertia, learning 
and adaptation, and make space for potential economic gains in the relationship 
between regulation and innovation. Kesidou and Demirel (2012) assume a stable 
demarcation rather than interaction between regulators and regulated firms, but, as 
Blind (2016, p. 451) recognizes, regulations are not only exogenous to companies. 
The possibility of feedback across a regulatory and innovation system is important. It 
can account for a breakdown in what the Porter Hypothesis outlines as a linear 
translation from short- to long-term effects for any episode of regulation and 
innovation (ibid.). From a process perspective, we envisage a series of interactions 
that have the potential to be consistent and support a relationship, albeit one 
vulnerable to breakdown in the midst of these interactions. This may be particularly 
relevant in the case of incremental innovation, where typically such interactions are 
recursive. 
2.2 Stabilizing the relationship through interactions and institutions 
Institutional researchers extend the understanding of routines and capabilities to 
consider a set of institutions, for example business organizations, regulators, and 
universities providing applied research and postgraduate training concerning 
regulation. Such institutions can stabilize and embed an array of interactions 
(Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013). For Paraskevopoulou (2012, p. 1069), “regulation as 
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an institution [is] formed through the interaction of various stakeholders and [is] 
continuously evolving in accordance with socio-economic changes”. She examines 
the development of REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction 
of Chemicals) and the chemicals industry and argues that, to be successful, regulation 
should become an institution, indicating a specific and stable pattern of interactions 
and roles among its participants. Hoffman (1999) also identifies a stable pattern of 
coalescence among institutions and organizational routines in the chemical industry 
internationally, terming it an ‘institutional field’. However, in a conclusion at variance 
to our argument, Hoffman indicates that the institutional field produces inertial effects 
– another kind of stability – deemed detrimental to innovation. In a study of 
nanomaterials used in the chemical industry, Justo-Hanani and Dayan (2014) assess 
contests of regulatory regimes, including those initiated and enforced by the State and 
those devised under voluntary conditions by industry associations. Justo-Hanani and 
Dayan attribute the relative success of States as regulators to them forming and 
participating in interactive relationships, implicitly involving a greater variety of roles 
than under the voluntary agreements of industry associations.  
Research focusing on interaction has developed from observing a relationship 
between regulation and innovation to addressing the form of that relationship, for 
instance as regulatory capture. Where Ambec et al. (2013) and Blind (2016) identify 
processes and interactions as research gaps, Carpenter and Moss (2014) argue that 
frequent interactions and negotiations have the potential to produce corrosive capture 
as producers articulate their interests to reduce the intensity or stringency of 
regulation. Kwak (2014) sees extensive regulator–industry interactions as leading to 
cultural capture, or at least cultural sharing, which could support Hoffman’s earlier 
conclusion of inertia. In contrast, McCarty (2014) shows that in complex regulatory 
settings, regulators often rely on specialized and operational knowledge and expertise 
from corporate actors. While this argument is broadly akin to arguments based on 
information asymmetry in earlier economics explanations (Laffont and Tirole, 1991), 
McCarty’s focus is on the potential of capture where interaction results in the 
accumulation of research evidence among producers. Carrigan (2014) presents similar 
findings in an historical study of the upstream petroleum industry in the US. He 
shows that regulators adopted an interactive approach, in part to contend with the 
specialist knowledge developed in situ by oil and gas companies and service 
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companies. From a process perspective, such interaction offers the prospect of 
learning rather than being restricted to short-term information asymmetries, capture 
and inertia.  
Gagnon (2016) proposes six forms of corporate capture: scientific, professional, 
technological, regulatory, market and civil society. He defines technological capture 
as ‘the establishment of technological standards or the appropriation of technical 
knowledge through patent portfolios’ (p. 242), but limits its role to interfirm 
competition and domination. Given our research questions concerning the 
implementation of regulation, we develop the definition of technological capture as 
utilizing an industry’s applied science capabilities to shape or influence regulatory 
trajectories. Building on McCarty (2014) and Carrigan (2014), we suggest that, as a 
potential by-product of producers’ scientific and innovative efforts to comply with 
regulatory mandates, technological capture may be a weak form of regulatory capture 
by industry actors. In support of this suggestion, Gregson, Watkins and Calestani 
(2013) describe the combination of markets, government policy and regulation in the 
UK Ship Recycling Strategy, where the potential for market failure destabilized the 
industry’s seemingly stable regulatory framework. Their study identifies a series of 
feedbacks in the relationship between regulation and incremental innovation, 
indicating how this relationship can be made and remade through multiple 
interactions. 
2.3 Environmental regulation and material agency  
In science and technology studies of environmental regulation, researchers have 
assessed how actors put regulation into practice (MacKenzie, 2009; Veal and Mouzas, 
2012). Actors introduce novel and sometimes competing models, lab experiments and 
observations for evaluating products and their effects in relation to regulation (Levin 
and Espeland, 2002). For instance, Veal and Mouzas (2012) examined the operations 
of the European Emissions Trading Scheme. They showed how a large manufacturer 
challenged the UK’s Environmental Agency over its regulatory models. This 
challenge shifted the contest from principles and broad policy targets to the measuring 
systems used to implement the principles. 
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Researchers in science and technology studies provide a focus on the role of material 
effects as an impetus and focus for contests in application. Material agency highlights 
the uncertainties inherent in applied science and technology, as these impinge upon 
activities ‘in the wild’ as distinct from ‘in the lab’ (Pickering, 1995; Latour, 2009). 
Pickering (1995, p. 7) sees science and technology as the ‘business of coping with 
material agency’. His statement indicates that objects have causal or agentic 
properties that cannot be anticipated or grasped fully in scientific practice, owing to 
the experimental quality of science. This holds as true at the micro scale of individual 
chemicals as it does at the macro scale of socio-environmental systems. For instance, 
Udovyk and Gilek (2013, p. 12) write of marine ecosystems “as virtually 
unpredictable and prone to surprises from both social and natural factors and/or their 
combinations, meaning that our knowledge of socio-ecological systems and the ability 
to predict their future changes might not always improve even after significant 
research”. In this sense, Pickering (1995) argues that scientists can only artfully 
‘frame’ material effects in order to contribute to an ‘interactive stabilization’ of social 
and material dynamics. 
As an irreducible source of uncertainty, material agency has the potential to unsettle 
regulation, in terms of its application, and businesses, in terms of their innovation 
trajectories. In these cases of ‘epistemic uncertainty’, actors are advised to devote 
efforts to on-going monitoring and accumulating data, so at least appreciating the 
bounds of their understanding (Udovyk and Gilek, 2013). Interested parties can also 
highlight material agency as a reason for lobbying by industry (Fineman, 1998; 
Lohmann, 2009) or for citizen participation in regulatory processes (Udovyk and 
Gilek, 2014). Where multiple actors contest the calculation of material effects, the 
arguments and evidence may be produced in a relatively orderly manner, but they 
may also create significant instabilities (Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, 2009). 
Different models of capturing material agency can compete with and complement one 
other, which actors can draw upon strategically in a process of ‘experimentalist 
governance’ (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2008). Thus, an experimental or participatory 
regulatory process may not always lead to stable outcomes (Gregson, Watkins and 
Calestani, 2013).  
2.4 Conceptualizing the relationship between regulation and innovation as a process 
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We propose a conceptual framework (Figure 1) that outlines ways in which regulation 
and innovation may relate to one another from a process perspective. Figure 1’s 
starting point is with actors identifying the effects of corporate activities, deemed 
harmful or hazardous by some, and not taken into account in established commercial 
exchanges (Coase, 1960). Following the OECD’s (1997) typology, these might be 
addressed if actors acquired and enforced property rights, thus proposing a market 
solution. Regulation could also be in the shape of a policy intervention, banning or 
restricting harmful substances. Following Sections 2.1 and 2.2 (above), both scenarios 
contribute to stable trajectories of innovation – where stability is the ability of 
industrial actors to predict the scope and consequences of regulatory engagement in 
their activities. We focus our argument on the middle column in Figure 1: regulatory 
settings in which implementation and operationalizing are critical, as in situations 
where hazards are qualified and uncertain. Actors typically make successive moves 
from Figure 1’s top to bottom. In so doing, they may encounter multiple dimensions 
of uncertainty, which we have highlighted in red in this Figure. Each of these 
uncertainties stimulates further episodes of interaction between regulators and those 
regulated. As discussed in Section 2.3 (above), research in science and technology 
studies provides insights into these interactions and suggests the existence of a 
number of feedback loops. Empirical detail is needed to address these recursive 
qualities and to validate this framework, which we turn to next. 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
3. Methods  
3.1 Research design 
Our research focused on regulating, producing and using production chemistry in the 
North East Atlantic. It covered a period of six years, as our interests in tracing 
interactions between regulation and incremental innovation required a longitudinal 
and processual research design (Langley, 2007; Van de Ven and Poole, 2005). 
When we negotiated access to a production chemistry company (hereafter ChemCo) 
in early 2006, our interest was in the combination of science, product development 
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and sales in the upstream petroleum industry. We began by undertaking a sampling 
exercise from ChemCo’s projects database, identifying seven projects that showed 
contrast across client, category of product and length of project. Interviews with the 
chemical company revealed the move towards ‘green chemistry’ and its regulation to 
be fundamental to most of these projects (Anastas and Warner, 1998). Green 
chemistry provided a focus on how regulation interacted with the development and 
use of production chemistry. This expanded the focus of our study from a single case 
firm to include the wider regulatory context in which this firm operates.  
Our study spanned multiple field sites: oil companies’ production facilities; chemical 
companies’ laboratories; events at non-governmental institutions and universities; 
conferences and trade-shows; and the regulators’ offices and meeting rooms. Overall, 
we traced how actors organized the regulation, production, exchange and use of 
production chemistry in 25 instances across business and policy events (summarized 
in Table 1). We undertook 36 formal and numerous informal interviews. We also 
amassed 160 hours of intense observation at meetings, conferences, and workshops, 
which we understood to be places where actors shaped production chemistry and 
regulation. We reviewed dozens of scientific papers, policy documents, meeting 
minutes and commentaries from environmental groups on production chemistry, 
produced water, the North East Atlantic’s ecosystems, the history of the OSPAR 
Commission and Convention (the Oslo and Paris Conventions for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic) and REACH (Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals).  
[TABLE 1] 
We organized our data in the software package QSR NVivo. Our initial analysis was 
inductive and independent across all authors involved. First readings aimed at 
identifying the activities, actors, materials, technologies, and texts involved in 
regulation and innovation. Guided by our conceptual background, we then 
interrogated and categorized field data against the concepts of stability, interaction, 
and material agency. We compared and contrasted our initial inductive analysis 
against these theory-led categories in a series of joint research meetings and revised 
our analysis where required. Finally, we presented our analysis to our research 
participants for further discussion and refinement. 
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3.2 Research setting 
3.2.1 The production chemistry industry 
The offshore oil and gas industry, as it operates in the North East Atlantic, raises a 
‘wide range of environmental concerns’ for regulatory bodies, oil companies, 
companies supplying oilfield chemical services, and environmental groups (OSPAR, 
2009, p. 5). The industry relies heavily upon incremental innovation for its 
continuation in an era of maturity. As such, it is a valuable case site for studying 
interactions between environmental regulation and incremental innovation. 
Production chemistry is a service for the upstream petroleum industry that is offered 
by a small number of chemical companies. In recent years this service has gained in 
importance with the physical maturing of the infrastructure for oil and gas production 
in the North Sea. Faced with a number of mature fields and the prospect of 
decommissioning, few oil companies can justify replacing the production and pipeline 
infrastructure. At the same time, oil companies are intensifying their use of the 
established infrastructure by tying-in new marginal and brownfield developments. 
Production chemists offer services to protect infrastructure and pipelines against 
corrosion from seawater or blockage by scaling and waxy deposits. This service 
covers regular application and monitoring of chemical solutions, and early diagnosis 
of new problems. Production chemistry also supports oil companies by separating oil 
from water during the production process and protecting against microbial infections 
and the corrosive effects of naturally occurring substances. 
Production chemists design their work to be compliant with the regulatory 
requirements of OSPAR and REACH, which may become more stringent over time. 
About half the workload of chemical companies is secured from oil companies under 
four or five-year Chemical Management Service Contracts, in which chemists include 
regulatory priorities and contingencies in annual work plans subject to quarterly 
reviews. Product formulation, testing, application and monitoring are some of the 
services that chemical companies carry out under these contracts. These activities see 
chemists contending with heterogeneous material problems across oilfields, many of 
which require on-going adaptive solutions. Chemists undertake radical innovation 
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infrequently owing to the complexity of the oil production systems and platform 
infrastructure, and risk avoidance on the part of clients’ asset managers. 
3.2.2 The focal case firm 
ChemCo is the third largest, by market share, of a handful of global chemistry 
companies specializing in the development, manufacture, application, and supply of 
chemicals and services to the oil and gas industry. The company commenced business 
in the mid-1980s as a start-up, initially serving the UK. Since 1995 it has been part of 
a larger trans-national chemicals group, which gives it access to fundamental 
chemistry research among base chemicals. It employs about 400 people globally and 
operates in all major upstream exploration and production locations. The company 
has an extensive science base, offers a complex range of products and services 
internationally to customers with varying knowledge and appreciation of production 
chemistry, and competes in the North Sea with five other chemical companies. 
The company and its competitors are in regular contact with regulators through 
formal and informal interactions, conferences and industry gatherings, and occasional 
joint industry research and development projects. The company also engages in 
several large academic collaborations. It runs an environmental research and testing 
laboratory, which addresses compliance with emergent regulation and undertakes 
some tests that can be used to preempt changes in environmental legislation. The labs 
serve oil and gas production facilities internationally, and are supported through local 
technical service units, which test and monitor the environmental compliance of 
customized products. 
3.2.3 The regulation of product chemistry 
The industry adds about 900,000 tons of chemicals annually into the oil-production 
facilities located in the North East Atlantic, some 250,000 tons of which are released 
into the sea (OSPAR, 2010a). Much of this quantity attaches itself to so-called 
‘produced water’ that is recovered alongside hydrocarbons and, after separation and 
treatment, often released from production facilities into the sea. At around 400 million 
cubic meters, produced water represents the industry’s largest waste stream and has 
been identified as one of the industry’s environmental ‘key issues’ (OSPAR, 2009).  
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Production chemistry products and services fall under the regulatory regimes of 
OSPAR and REACH. The EU’s REACH legislation, which entered into force on a 
phased basis during our initial research phase in 2007, seeks to replace a variety of 
national legislations with a singular system of chemical regulation for Europe. It 
requires companies to disclose the chemical components of products used in the EU 
and applies to all chemical substances that are manufactured, imported, placed on the 
market, or used within the European Community.1 
Preceding the European Union’s 2007 REACH regulation by 15 years, OSPAR has 
highlighted the gravity of chemical pollution and hazardous substances related to 
offshore activities and the necessity of members acting in a coordinated manner. 
OSPAR is a convention with signatories and contracting parties from the European 
Community and the fifteen nations with coastline on, or significant watercourses 
flowing into, the North East Atlantic. OSPAR’s mission is to: ‘conserve marine 
ecosystems and safeguard human health in the North-East Atlantic by preventing and 
eliminating pollution; by protecting the marine environment from the adverse effects 
of human activities; and by contributing to the sustainable use of the seas’   
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/marine/ospar.htm). This convention provides 
a process for its contracting parties (governments) to harmonize their regulation of the 
potentially hazardous substances that can enter the North East Atlantic’s marine 
environment as a result of activities in their waters or on their land. The aim of the 
regulations is to achieve ‘concentrations in the marine environment near background 
values for naturally occurring substances and close to zero for man-made synthetic 
substances’ (OSPAR, 2010b, p. 6). OSPAR works on a consensus basis, but once a 
decision is adopted it is legally binding for the Contracting Parties.  
 
4. Findings  
In this section we address our research questions in the context of our case study and 
assess: (1) how actors make regulation operational; (2) the ways in which this process 
of operationalization makes the relationship between regulation and incremental                                                         1 REACH regulations were phased in over 2007 to 2018 and thus not fully operational during our research period. We therefore decided to focus this investigation on OSPAR’s established regulatory framework for offshore chemicals.  
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innovation interactive; and (3) the potential consequences of these interactions. For 
our first question, we examine the three phases of our framework in Figure 1: 
formulating regulatory principles (Section 4.1); operationalizing principles through 
manuals, calculations and proposed tests (Section 4.2); and applying regulations in 
product formulation, testing and use (Section 4.3). Informed by our conceptual 
framework, in addressing our second and third questions we identify the ways that 
actors contend with and utilize the uncertainties encountered across these three 
interrelated phases (Section 4.4).  
4.1 Guiding innovation in production chemistry through regulatory principles 
Hazard describes the potential for chemical substances to harm – pollute – a marine 
ecosystem. There are different ways of capturing how hazards cause polluting effects. 
OSPAR’s contracting parties accept a general obligation to apply the following 
principles: precaution, polluter pays, and use of the best available techniques and 
environmental practice (OSPAR, 1992). Precaution offers a way for regulators to act 
on hazards in the absence of robust evidence and on the basis of worst-case scenarios. 
OSPAR was one of the first regulatory entities to embrace the precautionary principle, 
following the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992 (Knol, 
2011). Precaution has wide-ranging consequences for an industry’s involvement in an 
ecosystem. OSPAR formulates these as: 
a. the principle of substitution, i.e. the substitution of hazardous substances by 
less hazardous substances or preferably non-hazardous substances where such 
alternatives are available, will apply; b. emissions, discharges and losses of 
new hazardous substances shall be avoided, except where the use of these 
substances is justified by the application of the principle of substitution; c. the 
scientific assessment of risks should be used as a tool for setting priorities and 
developing action programmes (OSPAR, 2010b). 
‘Substitution’ makes reference to avoiding the introduction of potential pollutants into 
the Atlantic ecosystem and encourages innovation at ‘the beginning of the pipeline’. 
OSPAR and REACH aim for stringency over time, updating lists of chemicals to be 
substituted with chemicals evaluated as being less hazardous (Still, 2011). The 
substitution list forms part of the authorization process by which national government 
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agencies allow or disallow the use of substances offshore in accordance with 
OSPAR’s Harmonised Mandatory Control System (OSPAR, 2000). Regulators also 
establish timeframes for phasing out chemicals, which provide production chemists 
and oil companies with an impetus to plan innovation and substitution programs. 
For the ‘avoidance of discharge and emission’, OSPAR focuses attention on ‘the end 
of the pipeline’ (Fineman, 1998) and requires that produced water be sampled and 
analyzed regularly. Methods for these procedures are prescribed and acceptable limits 
are set and enforced. Sampling and testing produced water is typically carried out on 
behalf of the regulator by the oil company or their chemicals services supplier, with 
the data being collated and reported. When oil companies have ensured that they are 
producing water that is of an ‘acceptable standard’, it qualifies as a waste stream and 
can be discharged into the sea.  
Through ‘programs of innovation and monitoring risks’, OSPAR invites innovations 
in product development and regulatory models and standards, and encourages 
industry actors to think ‘beyond’ the pipeline. There are advances in treating and 
assessing the quality of produced water intended for injection into mature 
hydrocarbon reservoirs (LUX Assure, 2012). These developments include sensors and 
monitoring tools at the nanoscale. This principle connects the qualities of production 
chemistry with other areas of innovation, such as the capture, removal, and reuse of 
chemical residues in produced water. It also calls upon chemists to continue the 
development of techniques and standards, as well as of products that are less 
polluting.  
Two implications of the principle of precaution are apparent. First, OSPAR attaches 
the label of hazard to the chemical substance itself, removing considerations of local 
interactions among substance, seawater and the marine ecosystem’s constituents. 
Second, OSPAR promotes a standard and harmonized version of the regulatory 
jurisdiction as a basis for enacting the precautionary principle, with the most sensitive 
locality standing in for the whole jurisdiction. With this, OSPAR has defined standard 
versions of seawater, the marine environment, and production facilities, which are 
used as parameters in calculating the hazardous qualities of chemicals. This allows for 
a definitive ranking of chemical substances in terms of hazard and provides a basis for 
regulators when they issue substitution warnings and orders. Both implications have a 
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broadly stabilizing effect on the relationship between regulation and incremental 
innovation. This is evident as they refer to known global testing parameters and 
envisage predictable patterns for substituting hazardous with less hazardous chemicals 
over a defined time period. However, in accordance with Knol (2011, p. 400), we note 
that while the precautionary principle places the burden of proof on the polluter, 
precaution is also open to “much ambiguity as to what that ‘proof’ consists of”.  
4.2 Operationalizing regulatory principles  
OSPAR writes and deploys documents to establish a process by which precaution and 
hazard are made operational in guiding industrial activities. Some documents are co-
authored and others invite consultation, so they are both locations and means of 
interaction and consensus. The documents help actors settle controversies and 
establish the terrain covered by the settlement, for example with OSPAR it is the 
North East Atlantic. Critically, the documents establish the methods and measures by 
which the hazards of chemicals should be calculated.  
The key operational document presents a model known as Chemical Hazard and Risk 
Management (CHARM) (Thatcher et al., 2005). CHARM began as a joint-industry 
project among participants across OSPAR member nations. The resulting document is 
co-authored by regulators and production chemists working for oil and chemicals 
companies. CHARM assists regulators in defining the quality of hazard associated 
with chemical substances used in production chemistry. Chemicals are subject to 
ranking along a single index of hazard, the ‘Definitive Ranked Lists of Approved 
Products’. Each chemical substance – a component in a chemical product – is tested 
against the criteria for persistence in marine water, bioaccumulation in the lipids of 
organisms, and toxicity to marine organisms at three different positions in their food 
chains (OSPAR, 2005-9). The criteria are used to gauge the hazardous nature of a 
substance. The industry users must provide data related to the individual substances to 
the authorities that determine whether they can be used and discharged.  
CHARM comprises four modules. It’s first and second modules implement precaution 
through ‘realistic worst case scenarios’ to direct the use of chemicals in production 
facilities. In order to calculate a ranking of chemical substances according to the 
criterion for environmental hazard, CHARM requires deterministic calculations of the 
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ratio ‘PEC/PNEC’ (predicted environmental concentration relative to predicted ‘no 
effect’ concentration). 2  In the more recent third and fourth modules, CHARM 
provides a risk calculation that takes into account the local conditions of a production 
facility and a risk management model in which ‘preparations’ (combinations of 
chemicals as products) can be modelled. CHARM envisages different versions of 
PEC/PNEC across its modules as bases for calculating environmental hazard or risk 
and as a guide for risk management. Only in its ‘precaution’ version (the second 
module) can CHARM provide a unique ranking of substances because of the 
standardizing assumptions made as to subsea conditions and typical production 
facilities (Millais et al., 2011).  
In summary, CHARM aims to provide a vehicle for industrial actors to translate and 
implement the principle of precaution. In recent times the document has evolved from 
operationalizing the principle of precaution to guiding calculations on environmental 
harm based on the principle of risk. Calculations based on the principle of risk 
typically include a local assessment of hazards and often represent a lower threshold 
for chemical products to be cleared for use. This trajectory across its modules 
indicates an evolving knowledge base and potentially interactive regulatory process. It 
also opens up the document and its models to further challenges and development, as 
we will discuss below in Section 4.4. 
4.3 Putting regulation to work: Product formulation, testing and use 
In formulating, testing and applying chemical treatments compliant with OSPAR 
regulations, chemists are undertaking applied science. We observed notable 
heterogeneity in the problems encountered by chemists, as they contended with an 
oilfield’s specific geology and a production facility’s changeable chemical regime. 
Chemists sample the chemical regime of a production facility, usually in order to 
represent it in the lab on-shore and undertake tests for new chemical treatments. In the 
main, they conduct tests and experiments to assess the effectiveness of modified                                                         2 The PEC numerator of the ratio calculates the marine environment’s exposure to a chemical. The 
PNEC denominator of the ratio is an estimate of the sensitivity of the marine ecosystem’s species to a 
particular chemical. The PNEC is recorded in standard lab tests as the highest concentration at which 
researchers expect no adverse effects. If the PEC/PNEC ratio is greater than one, “an environmental 
effect may be expected”. The model allows two hazard quotients to be estimated: for a suspension in 
seawater and for sediment on the seabed. Rather than calculating an average, the greater value is taken, 
which is a further instance of the application of precaution (Thatcher et al., 2005). 
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treatments, compare feasible solutions to new problems, optimize the dosage in 
application, and assess the environmental hazard of a product. Across the production 
chemistry industry, tests are also undertaken by commissioned research institutes and 
independent labs (for instance SINTEF in Norway). 
We discuss three of our sample projects to illustrate how industrial chemists use 
incremental innovation when dealing with environmental regulation and customers’ 
site-specific production problems. Our first project (Project 5 in Table 1) shows how 
production chemistry can require fundamental as well as incremental innovation in 
order for products to meet regulatory criteria. The project involved ChemCo’s parent 
company developing a new chemical base so that ChemCo could, in turn, develop a 
less hazardous corrosion inhibitor for an oil company's pipeline. Pipelines are vital 
infrastructure, given the industry’s maturity, and require maintenance through 
chemicals management to ensure what the industry calls ‘asset integrity’. The project 
related to earlier work that was partially successful and paused after a chemical 
substance was downgraded in terms of hazard, no longer attracting a substitution 
warning. A further change in the ranking of that substance, under OSPAR’s 
Harmonized Chemical Management Regime, led to a renewed substitution warning 
and the resumption of the project. The incumbent corrosion inhibitor had eight 
component substances, and, by the time the project commenced, three had attracted 
substitution warnings and needed to be replaced. This project demonstrates the extent 
to which both fundamental and incremental innovation are motivated by periodic 
regulatory changes in a traditionally risk-adverse industry. In this industry, new or 
modified chemical treatments represent an unknown quantity as to how they might 
react with other chemicals or naturally occurring substances when applied in 
practice.3 
Chemists face material challenges in adapting their treatments to novel technical 
problems as well as to environmental regulation, as illustrated in our second case 
(Project 2 in Table 1). In this case, ChemCo had lost a contract to supply a corrosion 
inhibitor following a substitution warning from the regulator. The modified product 
was less hazardous and less effective when applied to the client’s facility, which 
included a novel subsea installation. Subsea installations at depth are challenging                                                         3 In our interviews, operations and asset managers were particularly slow to be persuaded to allow changes in chemical treatments in an oil field under their management. 
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settings for production chemistry because rapid temperature changes place additional 
stress on the stability of chemical treatments. A rival corrosion inhibitor had greater 
stability across the range of temperatures, but had a negative impact on the production 
system’s demulsifier. This meant a less effective separation of produced oil and water 
and an increased pollution hazard from production. The oil company needed a quick 
fix to the problem and was keen to deploy a modified version of ChemCo’s original 
product, for which improvement in stability could be made on the condition of 
seeking regulatory and time-limited approval. However, within the short time frame 
provided, ChemCo could not economically produce the modified corrosion inhibitor 
for this single application. This case draws attention to the difficulties created by 
regulating on the grounds of individual chemical hazard rankings, for which agreed 
test protocols have been established. In actual application, chemicals interact with a 
production system as part of a composite treatment regime, often with unpredictable 
consequences on the oil system and the environment. 
A third case (Project 7 in Table 1) illustrates the complexities of undertaking oilfield 
chemistry in a mature regulated industry. In oil and gas production, maturity presents 
many problems, such as corroding infrastructure, chemical accumulation from prior 
treatments and high levels of water in oil for near-exhausted oilfields. Oil companies 
often have to re-engineer oil and gas fields as they mature in order to maintain the 
production rate. The customer in Project 7 had acquired the oilfield and was re-
engineering its production infrastructure. A number of small problems had emerged, 
including microbial infection, which degraded the oil and increased its level in the 
produced water to slightly above the regulator’s limit of 30 mg/l. The problem of oil-
in-water could be treated using chemical demulsification alongside mechanical 
solutions. In addition, the microbial infection could be treated chemically through 
biocide products, but owing to their toxicity the regulator had banned the most 
effective of these treatments. Added to this problem, the permissible biocides tend to 
interact with demulsifiers and corrosion inhibitors, and can lead to excessive amounts 
of oil in produced water. Demulsifiers work quickly and, after an initial screening of 
alternative solutions in the lab, the chemists carried out tests live on the oil platform. 
However, ‘in the wild’ the tests provided inconclusive results as the facility’s 
chemical regime had changed quickly over multiple dimensions. In this case, 
adaptations in production chemistry met OSPAR’s regulatory standard for chemical 
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hazard but had detrimental effects on the quality of produced water, which created 
another hazardous effect. In addition, the material conditions around the mature 
platform changed too quickly for the treatment’s effects to be established 
conclusively. 
The three projects’ activities show that in attributing hazard as a deterministic quality 
to individual chemical substances, regulators motivate incremental innovation around 
developing and manufacturing ‘less hazardous’ chemicals. ‘In the wild’, however, 
these substances are typically applied as multi-component chemical treatments under 
varying local and often rapidly changing conditions. The chemicals become sources 
of material agency and uncertainty as they interact with one another, naturally 
occurring substances, and produced oil and water in ways that are unpredictable and 
frequently create additional effects and environmental concerns elsewhere in the 
system. Often, one episode of product development leads to multiple subsequent ones. 
The three projects also demonstrate that in application, controlling chemical hazards 
effectively requires trade-offs between treatment regimes exhibiting different profiles 
of risks. 
4.4 How material agency destabilizes regulation  
We have illustrated how precaution is the guiding principle of OSPAR’s regulatory 
and scientific discourses. As outlined in Section 4.1, regulating by reference to 
precaution involves regulators providing guidance on chemicals’ environmental 
hazards. It also requires industrial chemists to engage in incremental innovation, in 
order to develop and apply regulation compliant products. Regulation and innovation 
could thus be related in a relatively linear process. However, the relationship is less 
stable when users acquire, accumulate and circulate an evidential basis that can 
challenge regulatory assumptions about the hazards of chemicals. In our case, 
chemists’ evidence drew upon local data collection and simulations in labs and was 
therefore fragmented. Nevertheless, it provided sufficient grounds for oil and 
chemistry companies to begin challenging regulatory principles. Some industrial 
chemists argued that their data shows that the marine environment presents 
heterogeneous conditions locally, such that what may be hazardous in and around one 
production facility may not be so at another. Given the continuing uncertainties as to 
the precise calculation of environmental hazards and in the light of evidence 
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underlining some of these uncertainties, the chemists proposed risk assessment rather 
than precaution as an alternative basis for regulation. Precaution and risk also entail 
significant differences in ways of stating assumptions and calculating the hazards of 
chemicals. While precaution is based on global parameters, risks are calculated as 
interactions between a chemical substance and its local conditions at the site of 
application. The principles imply different ways in which regulators and chemists 
interact, for instance in gathering and combining fragments of data, and in stating 
assumptions about hazards (Carolan, 2007; van Hoof and van Tatenhove, 2009).  
Industry actors drew upon principles in conjunction with the experimental field data 
as a way of contesting some of the regulatory documents, for instance by organizing 
multiple forums on the subject of precaution and risk. We attended several of these, 
which included national regulators involved in OSPAR and the European Chemicals 
Association as part of the REACH process. Applied chemical scientists also presented 
case studies at professional conferences, such as those organized by the Society of 
Petroleum Engineers and by the Royal Society of Chemistry, which have regulators in 
attendance. At these forums, data were not so much mobilized to challenge regulation 
over adjusting the specific operationalization of precaution in CHARM, but rather 
used as a basis for the much more far-reaching challenge of replacing precaution – 
OSPAR’s foundational principle – with a risk-based approach. In other words, 
chemical companies felt they had collated sufficient data to substantiate their 
concerns over investing in compliant chemistry processes, substances, and products to 
reduce hazards that may not be manifest in many local instances of product use.  
In response to these challenges, following considerable discussion, and encouraged by 
the overlapping developments in REACH (European Chemicals Agency, 2008, 2012), 
OSPAR has recently published its CHARM Modules 3 and 4 (OSPAR 2012a, 2012b) 
as recommendations. In these modules, OSPAR has made risk into an operational 
practice alongside precaution, notably by providing procedures for the calculation of 
local effects measured as ‘exposure assessment’. This extension of hazard to risk has 
encouraged others to develop alternative algorithms, which are probabilistic in their 
local applications (Karman and Reerink, 1998; Millais et al., 2011) and further 
promoted risk as an alternative driver of chemical regulation in offshore settings. 
Thus, a consequence of site-specific problem-solving is that chemists test the limits of 
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environmental regulation in a number of settings and under various conditions, which 
they can then bring to challenge regulation in terms of principles. 
 
5. Discussion  
5.1 Summary of Findings 
Our findings suggest that it is important to understand the process by which 
environmental regulation is made operational, as this is integral to capturing the 
relationship between regulation and incremental innovation (Ambec et al., 2013; 
Blind, 2016). We show that this process is not only a matter of regulators drawing 
upon a science base to document appropriate tests and stages of approval. Researchers 
have argued that environmental regulation may be prone to multiple sources of 
uncertainty, which justifies adopting a process approach (Knol, 2011; Udovyk and 
Gilek, 2013). Indeed, in the cases we investigated the uncertainties were profound. In 
contrast to other chemistry fields, such as those related to Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (Hardy and Maguire, 2010), many production chemicals remain in use in 
modified form, with use continuing to generate additional data. Even though these 
data points were generated opportunistically by industry actors in the course of 
chemical development and application, they have the potential to undermine the very 
principle – precaution – upon which OSPAR’s regulation and guidance to industrial 
actors is based.  
5.2 Research contributions  
5.2.1 Material agency 
De Vaujany et al. (2015, p. 3) note that ‘Regulation appears as an ideational, often 
discursive, set of practices.’ With our study, we draw attention to material agency and 
its potential effects on regulatory principles. The extent of documentation in our case 
shows that, as a principle, precaution is not applicable singularly in guiding the 
development and use of production chemistry. To recall, some chemists draw on 
evidence of heterogeneous material effects to contest the feasibility of a definitive 
ranking system that identifies hazards with specific chemical substances. The science 
base of applied production chemistry is mainly located within companies, which is a 
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common basis for established understandings of regulatory capture supported by 
information asymmetry (Carrigan, 2014). Chemists undertake applied work as a series 
of short projects, typically yielding incremental innovation, in response to regulatory 
changes and heterogeneous challenges emerging from oil companies’ production flow 
and maintenance. Much of the chemists’ problem-solving is bound by commercial 
confidentiality and embedded in specific business-to-business relationships, forming a 
fragmented evidence base.  
However, that same evidence is subject to common and therefore stable testing 
procedures, including those recognized by regulators, which increases the potential 
for combination and comparison of results. On occasion, chemists are able to draw 
upon their fragmentary findings, reinterpreted as field or lab experiments, to work 
through the consequences of adopting and applying the rival principles of precaution 
and risk. Applied chemists also draw upon the research base of universities and 
research institutes for longer joint industry projects. The conferences of the Royal 
Society of Chemistry and the Society of Petroleum Engineers provide forums for 
chemists to operate at arm’s length from their company role. Some university 
researchers are also active at these conferences. Thus, similar to previous research 
findings (Hardy and Maguire, 2010; Hoffman, 1999), the institutions of applied 
chemistry provide a basis for contest and challenge as part of the regulatory process, 
with interactions in our case spanning knowledge sharing, market exchange, 
adaptations of products to regulation, and discussions of regulatory principles. In 
contributing to this research, we highlight that where our findings indicate a pattern of 
social interaction, these interactions are often motivated and sustained by material 
agency (Pickering, 1995). 
5.2.2 Interactive stabilization 
In answering our research question of how regulation is made operational, we identify 
a process of interactive stabilization. The relationship between regulation and 
incremental innovation unfolds as a matter of recurring organization, which is 
distributed among regulatory and industrial actors. Stability has multiple meanings in 
regulatory theory and practice, from analytical or modelling assumptions to empirical 
observation (Blind, 2012; Kesidou and Demirel, 2012; Justo-Hanani and Dayan, 
2014). We find that actors go about achieving stability recursively and mainly through 
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the processes of documenting agreements, be these in regulation or commercial 
contracting. Stability is in the web of interleaving documents rather than in one 
document per se (Paraskevopoulou, 2012).  
The stability and predictability of regulatory phasing is necessary for industry actors 
in order to plan the development and marketing of chemical products and services. 
These regulatory changes generally take the form of advance notices of amendments 
in CHARM’s definitive ranking of chemicals by hazard. For industry actors, this is 
made more complex by production chemistry being subject to two regulatory 
processes, which at the time of our fieldwork were not fully harmonized. While 
OSPAR is interested primarily in hazards posed to the marine environment, REACH 
requires disclosure of the chemical components of products, which causes great 
concern to industry actors as it allows others to view the outcomes of lab work on 
devising specific chemical treatments. With its emphasis on products rather than 
chemical components, the REACH process provides an additional impetus for 
companies to refocus their attention on the principles of risk and precaution. This 
undermines the way in which OSPAR has translated precaution into its regulatory 
process based on ranking the hazards posed by particular substances.  
5.2.3 Technological capture 
In our findings, we identify two ways in which industry actors cope with uncertainty: 
(1) the collation of scientific and technological data as evidence in response to the 
material agency of the industry’s products and services; and (2) the social interactions 
and contests in relation to policy, enabled by material agency. Taken together, we 
characterize these as instances of technological capture (Gagnon, 2016). Given our 
conceptual framework, we develop technological capture by applying it to a 
processual explanation of the relationship between regulation and innovation, and 
refine and validate it in our case study. Regulatory capture, the focal construct of 
recent research, features little by way of interaction around material effects. Social or 
cultural capture (Carrigan and Coglianese, 2011, 2014; Kwak, 2014) is consistent 
with institutional regulation, as per Hardy and Maguire’s (2010) study of policy-
making in the banning of persistent organic pollutants. Corrosive capture (Carpenter, 
2014) describes how well-resourced industry lobbies attempt to dilute stringent and 
costly regulatory requirements. Our findings qualify the corrosive role of industry 
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interests. If there is corrosive capture, it is motivated by material effects and enabled 
by an industry’s applied science expertise, both of which are prominent in the domain 
of environmental regulation (McCarty, 2014). In short, we claim that resistance to and 
potential capture of regulation often happens by applied science testing it on the 
ground and addressing dynamic material effects through incremental innovation, thus 
working with and against regulation in a nuanced interactive process. We 
acknowledge, with Carrigan (2004) and McCarty (2014), the possibility that the 
interactive relationship we describe is also a learning relationship, in which regulators 
rely on the industry’s science base for knowledge accumulation. We would encourage 
future research to investigate the bounds between scientific knowledge sharing and 
technological capture in more detail through other research sites and methods. 
5.3 Policy Implications 
Our paper focuses on the relationship of regulation and incremental innovation. The 
process of interactive stabilization that we identify raises important policy questions. 
The EU has been developing a broader integrated approach to marine stewardship, 
driven by fisheries and shipping policy as well as hydrocarbons exploration and 
production (van Hoof and van Tatenhove, 2009). The impetus from the EU is 
explicitly to include concerned publics into its regulation and application (van den 
Hove, 2007). Udovyk and Gilek (2014) concentrate on the implementation of 
REACH for the marine environment. In parallel to our findings, they identify 
significant uncertainties and fragmentation in relation to the science base. Assessed 
from a perspective of ‘post-normal science’ where facts are uncertain and stakes are 
high, Udovyk and Gilek argue that greater participation can help challenge and direct 
science towards more effective problem-solving and encourage a greater array of 
experimental activity. We develop this insight by showing that fragmentation is 
driven by practical problem-solving pertaining to material effects and, most 
immediately, varied commercial interests, which can spill over into some expert 
forums. Thus, with Carolan (2007), we encourage a stronger recognition of the need 
for developing ‘citizen science’ expertise in order to contend with technological 
capture, perhaps as part of non-governmental organizations’ efforts to retain or build 
out a science capability.  
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A related policy development is the EU’s model of Responsible Research and 
Innovation, which is written into the Horizon 2020 program. Often the concerns of 
science and policy focus on regulation and its evidence base, principles, and 
participation. However, Owen, Macnaghten and Stilgoe (2012) write of responsible 
research and innovation in shaping requirements rather than regulating effects. This 
goes beyond the scope of our paper but points towards broader societal questions of 
‘how the targets for innovation can be identified in an ethical, inclusive, democratic 
and equitable manner’ (ibid., p. 754). Responsible innovation indicates a need for a 
more developed policy on energy production and use, contingent upon the maturity of 
hydrocarbons production offshore, fluctuating prices, and considerations of the 
eventual decommissioning of production infrastructure. Researching this issue in 
relation to how society and governments may direct an industry’s efforts at radical 
innovation would also address a limitation of this paper, which considers interaction, 
material agency and technological capture in the context of incremental innovation. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our findings highlight the role that applied science and data can play in shaping 
evolving environmental regulation.  We describe this as a process of interactive 
stabilization and assess it in terms of an industry’s incremental innovation activities. 
We have shown that regulation through the precautionary principle, as in our case 
through OSPAR, is inherently interactive in its operationalization. Its actors are likely 
to encounter uncertainty by means of these interactions, notably through the 
contingency of undertaking science ‘in the wild’. This uncertainty provides an 
impetus for incremental innovation to industry actors, who work across principles, 
documents and activities to comply with, challenge, and shape evolving regulatory 
demands. Material effects or, with Pickering (1995), ‘material agency’, draw our 
attention to regulators’ dependence on continuing advances in applied science and 
technology. This is evident as companies in the industry test regulations in product 
formulation, exchange, and use. Material effects lead to interactions not just around 
issues of regulatory implementation, but also on the overarching principles of 
regulation. The level of interaction in our case may even be greater than in other 
studies of regulation and innovation (Kesidou and Demirel, 2012; Justo-Hanani and 
Dayan, 2014), partly because many products remain in use, although modified in 
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response to regulation. Thus, in keeping with Laffont and Tirole’s (2001) observation 
that research into regulation should be industry specific, the focus on material effects 
provides a boundary condition for this paper’s general contribution, pertaining to the 
continuing involvement of applied science in regulatory processes. While our industry 
case is distinctive in the extent to which material effects give rise to regulatory 
challenges on the part of industry actors, we suggest that it may be one example of 
several industries where the main science base resides in industry, and particularly in 
well-resourced large-sized or specialized firms. In these cases, the potential of 
technological capture of regulation through an industry’s applied science base is a real 
and pressing one, which deserves further attention from researchers and policy 
makers. 
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Table 1: Log of data collection 
Year Event  
2006 Introductions to ChemCo, interviews with Senior Management, laboratory 
visits 
2006 Project 1: 
Adapting a product for a large oil company; interview and documentary trail  
2006 Project 2  
Product testing with OilCo 2; interview and documentary trail 
2006 Project 3 
ChemCo’s US marketing group instigating deep water chemical innovation; 
interview and documentary trail 
2006 Project 4  
Deployment of existing product in small oil company client; interview and 
documentary trail 
2006 Project 5 
Corrosion project for OilCo1’s pipeline; interview and documentary trail 
2006/7 Project 6 
Innovating for a new way to apply production chemicals; interview and 
documentary trail 
2007 Project 7 
Change in existing product with repercussions across sales, production and 
logistics; interview and documentary trail 
2006 Quarterly review meeting with OilCo1  
2007 Follow-up meeting with ChemCo and OilCo1 
2007 Quarterly review meeting with OilCo 2  
2007 Follow-up meeting with ChemCo and OilCo 2 
2008 Society for Petroleum Engineers Oilfield Scale and Corrosion Conferences 
(2x); observation and conference documents 
2008 Meeting with the Secretary of the European Oilfield Speciality Chemicals 
Association, subsequent email exchanges with Chair and Secretary 
2009 Produced Water Workshop, Edinburgh, 2 days; observation and conference 
documents 
2011 Meeting with European Oilfield Speciality Chemicals Association and a 
production company 
2012 Royal Society of Chemistry and UK Chemicals Stakeholder Forum, jointly 
held workshop on socio-economic assessment for REACH authorization; 
observation and conference documents  
2012 UK Chemical Stakeholders’ Forum meeting, including an address by the 
Minister of the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs; 
observation and conference documents  
2012 Meetings with 2 consulting companies and 1 production company 
2012 Interview with produced water expert  
 2 
2012 European Chemicals Agency Stakeholders’ Day; observation and conference 
documents  
2012 Helsinki Chemicals Forum 2012 (2 days); observation and conference 
documents 
2012 Meeting with UK’s Department of Energy & Climate Change, Centre for 
Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science and Marine Scotland 
2012 Meeting at Greenpeace Science Unit 
2012 OSPAR Secretariat (4 days); interviews and observations 
 
